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No. 87 L 00111
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
LAWRENCE A. WILSON d/b/a SENTRY SERVICES
Defendant-Petitioner,
VS.
JOHN SLATER,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

BENCH MEMORANDUM*
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case comes before the Supreme Court of the State of Marshall on its order granting Defendant, Lawrence Wilson d/b/a Sentry Services, leave to appeal. The Marshall Appellate Court for the
First Judicial Circuit reversed the order of the Lincoln County District Court, granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The parties stipulated to the facts which follow. Lawrence Wilson is the sole proprietor of Sentry Services, a private security guard
and night watch service. John Slater is a former employee of Sentry.
Slater began his employment with Sentry in 1983, working night
shifts while pursuing his business degree at the University of
Marshall.
To ascertain whether its employees are in adequate physical
condition, Sentry provides an annual physical testing program which
includes a blood test. In years past, Wilson informed employees that
their blood would be tested for cholesterol levels, related to cardiovascular problems, and for hypoglycemia, a disorder associated with
diabetes. The test results were recorded in each employee's personnel file. This medical information was always kept confidential. Any
employee with a cardiovascular or blood-sugar disorder was given a
leave of absence until the company physician informed the employer
that the employee could safely return to work. Slater never objected
to the company physical.
* This memorandum was prepared by Mark A. Absher, Associate Justice, John
Marshall Law School Moot Court Executive Board.
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In December of 1986, the Lincoln Medical Laboratory, retained
by Sentry for purposes of its testing program, suggested that Wilson
include HIV tests in the April, 1987, physical. Wilson decided to
order the test; however, he did not notify the employees of this decision. The testing was otherwise completed as usual.
Slater left the company on April 30, 1987, to complete his exams and begin his search for business related employment. On May
1, 1987, Wilson was informed by the laboratory that Slater tested
positive for the existence of the HIV (AIDS) antibody. Wilson contacted Slater that same day, informing him of the test and the test
results.
Subsequently, on May 6, 1987, Wilson attended the monthly
luncheon of the Lincoln County Chamber of Commerce held at a
local restaurant. Approximately 75 people attended the luncheon.
During lunch, before the start of the business meeting, people at
Wilson's table began discussing AIDS. Wilson informed his friends
that he had tested his employees for the AIDS antibody and that
one, John Slater, tested positive.
Slater's complaint, filed June 12, 1987, alleges that Wilson invaded Slater's privacy in two ways. First, Slater alleges that Wilson
intruded into his seclusion when he tested Slater for the AIDS antibody. Second, Slater alleges that Wilson invaded Slater's privacy
when Wilson publicly disclosed the private fact that Slater tested
positive for the AIDS antibody. Slater and Wilson filed cross motions for summary judgment. In support of his motion, Slater submitted a copy of the Recommendation for Preventing Transmission
1. "Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is the internationally recognized

name for the virus that is believed to cause AIDS. The virus has also been called LAV
(Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus type III) and HTLV-III (Human T-Lymphotropic Virus)." Schatz, The Aids Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1782, n. 2 (1987). The HIV test to determine the existence of the
antibody is comprised of a series of three tests, known as the ELISA-ELISA-Western
Blot series. The ELISA (enzyme-lined immunosorbent assay test, "the most widely
used, detects the antibodies which indicate exposure to the disease." Rousseau, The
AIDS Epidemic and the Issues in the Workplace, 72 MAss. L. REV. 51, 52 (1987).
"The second more specific and expensive test for detecting [the HIVI antibodies is
the Western Blot test." Id. "A person with two positive ELISA tests and positive WB
[Western Blot] is a true confirmed positive with 99.9% reliability." Clifford & Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 1806, 1812 (1987). It is important to note, however, that "[c]urrent medical testing techniques only indicate whether an individual's blood possesses AIDS antibodies.
Presence of AIDS antibodies indicates only that an individual has experienced past
exposure to the AIDS virus. It does not conclusively establish that the individual is a
carrier of active virus, although the probability that the individual [has AIDS] is substantial. Nor does it conclusively establish that the individual will develop symptoms
of AIDS related complex (ARC symptoms) or suffer the full blown disease state itself." Cross & Haney, Legal Issues Involved in Private Sector Medical Testing of Job
Applicants and Employees, 20 IND. L. REV. 517, 518 n. 9 (1987) (emphasis in
original).
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of Infection with Human T-Lymphotrophic Virus Type III/
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace prepared by
the Center for Disease Control. Wilson submitted no evidence to
contravene the report but argued that the report itself was irrelevant to the determination of the issues.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count I of the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the
disease information contained in Slater's blood did not constitute a
privacy interest protected by the tort of intrusion into seclusion. It
further stated that "even if the plaintiff proved a prima facie case of
invasion of privacy, this Court is not persuaded that the plaintiff's
privacy interest outweighs the employer's right to acquire the information." The appellate court disagreed, holding that the "physiological biography contained in the blood of an individual is private information which an individual can reasonably expect to be left
alone."
The trial court also granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
Count II of the plaintiff's complaint. That court concluded that "because (1) AIDS is lethal; (2) research into AIDS is, by virtue of its
novelty, incomplete; and (3) the public is terrified of infection regardless of the current evidence as to the transmissibility of AIDS,
the public's need to be informed outweighs any privacy interest"
that Slater may have. Again, the appellate court disagreed. After
discussing the limited transmissibility of the AIDS virus, the court
concluded that "only Slater's sexual partners or those people who
are likely to have contact with Slater's blood can show a need for
results of the HIV tests. The public at large has no need. Moreover,
none of the recipients of the information was Slater's sexual partner
or likely to be exposed to Slater's blood." The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for trial
on the question of damages. The Supreme Court of Marshall
granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
II.

INTRODUCTION

The common law tort, invasion of privacy, is actually the genus
of four distinct species. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652
(1977). The right to privacy is invaded when there is (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, (2) commercial appropriation of another's name or likeness, (3) unreasonable publicity
given to another's private life and (4) unreasonable publicity which
places another in a false light. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544,
562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
652B (1977). In this case the Court is called upon to determine the
parameters of the privacy torts, intrusion upon seclusion and public
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disclosure of private facts, within the context of the employer-employee relationship. The questions presented by this case have been
anticipated by various commentators:
One might imagine a privacy action premised on the theory that requiring an intrusive medical procedure whose results may not lawfully
be used is an unjustified invasion of the body, a kind of physical assault, and certainly an insult to the physical integrity of the employee.
Furthermore, if the employee tests seropositive and the employer fails
to keep the information confidential, one can imagine the potential for
defamation and related tort developments.
Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 11, 46 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
Ideally, the integrity of individuals who have access to AIDS-related
information and formal procedures established by agencies holding
such information would be sufficient to ensure confidentiality. Violations are certain to occur, however, and when they do, criminal sanctions and civil remedies must be available to redress breaches of the
confidentiality of AIDS-related information.
Comment, Protecting Confidentiality in the Effort to Control
AIDS, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 315 (1986).
Some states have enacted statutes in anticipation of problems
related to those presented here. California, for example, recently enacted its "Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Public Health
Records Confidentiality Act," which provides a civil penalty of
$1,000 to $5,000 plus court costs against "[a]ny person who willfully
or maliciously discloses the content of any confidential public health
record. . . to any third party. . . ." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §
199.45(e) (Deering 1986). A Massachusetts statute provides that "no
employer shall require HTLV-III antibody or antigen tests as a condition of employment." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70F (West
1986). Wisconsin has a similar statute. WiS. STAT. §§ 103.15, 146.025
(1985). There are, however, no applicable Marshall statutes, and
there are no cases from any jurisdiction directly on point.
Commentators speculate "that the dearth of common law invasion of privacy suits involving the employee-employer relationship
may be because conflicts over the issue arise and are settled in" arbitration. Menard & Morrill, The Employer and the Law of Privacy
in the Workplace-the U.S. Model to Date, 9 N.C.J. INT'L & COM.
REG. 93, 109 (1983).
The parties' interests in this matter are complicated by the nature of the AIDS disease. The employee's interest in keeping his
condition private is augmented by the fact that the disease is largely
transmitted by socially unacceptable conduct.2 His interest in pri2. "The CDC has identified six at risk groups prone to infection: (1) gay and
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vacy, however, is set against the interests of 'his employer and the
general public in identifying carriers of the deadly disease.'
While the trial court found the employer's interests to be
greater, the appellate court held that the balance tips in favor of the
employee's right to privacy on both counts. This Court must, therefore, decide (1) whether Wilson invaded Slater's privacy when Wilson, without informing Slater, tested Slater for the AIDS antibody,
and (2) whether Wilson invaded Slater's privacy when Wilson disclosed to members of the general public the fact that Slater tested
positive for the AIDS antibody.

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

INTRUSION INTO SECLUSION

The first issue presented by this appeal is whether Wilson invaded Slater's privacy when Wilson, without informing Slater,
tested Slater for the AIDS antibody. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides that
[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).1
To establish his prima facie case for this species of privacy invasion, the plaintiff must show (1) a matter which plaintiff has a right
to keep private, (2) that the defendant intruded into that private
bisexual men (2) intravenous drug users (3) prostitutes (4) persons transfused with
contaminated blood (5) any sexual partners of people in at risk groups and (6) children born to mothers at risk." Rousseau, The Aids Epidemic and the Issues in the
Workplace, 72 MASS. L. REV. 51, 51-52 (1987). Of these six groups, "[olver 70% of the
reported AIDS cases occur in homosexual and bisexual males . . ." Closen, et al,
AIDS: Testing Democracy-IrrationalResponses to the Public Health Crises and the
Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835, 865 (1986).
3. "As of June 9, 1986, there had been 21,517 cases of AIDS reported to the
C.D.C. Of these cases, there have been 11,713 deaths attributed to AIDS in the
United States alone." Closen, et al., AIDS: Testing Democracy-IrrationalResponses to the Public Health Crises and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing,
19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835, 850 (1986).
4. Many courts look primarily to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for an authoritative definition of actionable conduct in cases of invasion of privacy. See, e.g,
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581, 588 (1984) ("In
nearly all of the Oregon opinions discussing invasion of privacy, the court has cited
with approval the definitions of invasion of privacy given in the Restatement,"); Harris v. Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Pa. Super. 1984) (stating
that the Pennsylvania state courts have "cited with approval the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B-E for support regarding invasion of privacy matters). The
Restatement's analysis of the privacy torts is largely attributed to "Dean Prosser's
influence as the first reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts .... " 1 Privacy
Law and Practice, T 1.01 at 1-6 (G. Trubow ed. 1987). Prosser's presentation of the
privacy torts in Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. (1960), parallels that of the Restatement.
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matter, and (3) that the defendant's intrusion was objectionable to
the reasonable person. Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271, 276-277,
167 N.W.2d 841, 845 (1969).
1. Protected Interest: A Physiological Biography
The first subordinate issue in this count is whether the disease
information contained within Slater's blood is a seclusion which he
could reasonably expect to have been left alone. The Restatement
provides that the protected interest extends to any "seclusion that
the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs," or otherwise to
anything "not exhibited to the public gaze." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 652B comment c (1977). Other comments and illustrations suggest that a plaintiffs interest is expansive, protecting the
privacy of information in several categories, including (1) his actions
in non-public locations, such as his home, his room in a hotel, or
even his hospital room; (2) information which may be communicated
through his mail or his telephone; (3) information which he has
stored in places, such as his wallet, his safe, or his personal files, and
(4) information which others may have about him on record, such as
a bank account.
Courts have further expanded the protected interest. See, e.g.,
Harkey v. Abate, 131 Mich. App. 177, 346 N.W.2d 74 (1983) (plaintiff found to have a right to privacy in a public rest room); Phillips
v. Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So.2d 705, 708-09 (Ala. 1983)
(plaintiff found to have a privacy interest in her "emotional sanctum," which includes her right to be free from lurid propositions);
DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 76 (1881) (plaintiff found
to have a privacy interest in the area around the room from which
her childbirth was viewable and audible); but see, Lewis v. Dayton
Hudson Corporation, 128 Mich. App. 165, 339 N.W.2d 857 (1983)
(no reasonable expectation of privacy in retailer's fitting room where
sign indicated that the room was under surveillance); Eddy v.
Brown, 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986) (employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy vis-a-vis his employer in his employment medical
records).
While there are no common law tort cases suggesting that the
privacy interest includes a plaintiffs physiological biography, such
an interest has been acknowledged as protected under the Fourth
Amendment from an unreasonable search.' See, e.g., McDonnell v.
5. As a legal concept, privacy finds expression in three areas: constitutional,
statutory and common law. Department of Mental Health v. Texas State Employees
Union, 798 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App. 1986). One journalist notes, however, that "it is
anticipated that the same [consitutional] principles will be applied in the private sector to form the basis for privacy claims" as are used in the public sector. Harstein,
Drug Testing in the Work Place: A Primer for Employers, 12 EMPL. REL. L.J. 577,
589 (1987).
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Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D.C. Iowa 1985). In McDonnell, the
plaintiffs brought an action challenging the policy of the Department of Corrections which permitted urinalysis and blood tests of
employees upon the request of department officials. After noting
that "both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical laboratory
to discover numerous physiological facts about the person from
whom its came," the District Court stated that "[o]ne clearly has a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in such personal
information contained in his body fluids." 612 F. Supp. at 1127.
Slater should argue that the disease information contained in his
blood is a seclusion within the scope of the protected interest. He
should argue that his interest in being free from intrusion into his
physiological biography is at least as great as his interest in being
free from intrusion into his actions at his home or intrusion into his
personal documents. He should further argue that since his physiological biography is not open for public inspection or casual observation, it is information which should be protected from intrusion. Finally, he should argue that, because information about his condition
has been recognized to be "highly sensitive and personal," Comment, Protecting Confidentiality in the Effort to Control AIDS, 24
HARV. J. ON LEGIS, 315, 318 (1986), he has a right to keep such information private.
Wilson on the other hand, should argue that Slater's claim that
a "physiological biography" constitutes a seclusion is at best tenuous, considering that it has never been held to be a seclusion by any
court, any statute, or the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
2. Prohibited Conduct: The Intrusion
The second subordinate issue is whether Wilson's testing of
Slater's blood for the AIDS antibody amounts to an intrusion. The
Restatement provides that an invasion may be by (1) physical intrusion into a place where the plaintiff has secluded himself, (2) use of
the defendant's senses to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private
affairs, or (3) some other form of investigation or examination into
plaintiff's private concerns. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B,
comment b.
An intrusion is not actionable unless it is unreasonable.
Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d
1101, 1117 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 571 (1987) (shadowing
surveillance not actionable); accord, McLain v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 271 Or. 549, 533 P.2d 343 (1975). There is no liability unless the intrusion is substantial and highly offensive. Sofka v. Thal,
662 S.W.2d 502, 511 (Mo. 1983) (six to eight polite phone calls by a
collection agency over a period of several months not substantial
enough to be actionable); Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 130 Ga.
App. 254, 202 S.E.2d 701 (1973) (surveillance of plaintiffs actions
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around home and while driving not substantially intrusive); see also
McCormick v. Haley, 37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 307 N.E.2d 34, 38 (1973)
(negligent intrusion not actionable).
An intrusion will be actionable, however, when it is offensive to
reasonable people. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 563 (Mo.
App. 1987). In Hester the Missouri Appellate Court concluded that
acquiring private information through subterfuge constitutes an actionable intrusion. 723 S.W. 2d at 563. In that case the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant pastor had entered their home under the
pretense of providing family counseling while his true motive was to
harm them with information that he acquired. Id. at 562. The trial
court dismissed that count of the plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 549.
The appellate court reversed, noting that the allegations "describe a
substantial interference with seclusion and of the kind decidedly offensive to reasonable persons." Id. at 563.
Additionally, a court has found an actionable intrusion where
the press gained entrance by subterfuge into the home of the plaintiff and photographed him there. Dietemann v. TIME, Inc., 449
F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). A similar result occurred where a news
photographer published a picture taken surreptitiously of a patient
in her hospital bed. Barber v. TIME, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.
2d 291 (1942).
Slater should argue that Wilson's actions are no different from
the actions of the pastor in Hester or the photographs in Dietemann
and Barber. Slater should emphasize that in this case Wilson tested
Slater for the AIDS antibody under the guise of conducting the
usual annual physical, and argue that such actions amount to an unreasonable intrusion.
It is difficult for Wilson to argue that there was no intrusion. He
can, however, argue that the intrusion was not surreptitious in any
way. Wilson took no affirmative steps to deceive Slater. He should
further argue that the intrusion was reasonable considering that it
was done for the benefit of the employee (not to mention those with
whom Slater may have sexual contact). Finally, Wilson should dismiss the matter simply by arguing either (1) that because there is no
seclusion, it follows that there can be no intrusion, or (2) that the
intrusion was justified.
3. JustificationFor Conduct: Wilson's Defense6
Assuming that Wilson's testing of Slater for the AIDS antibody
amounted to an intrusion into Slater's seclusion, Slater could lose
this count if Wilson's actions were justified. See, Lunch v. Johnston,
6.

While Wilson's justification is not part of Slater's prima facie case, Slater

must be able to show that Wilson's action was unpermitted.
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. .to be actionable, the
alleged invasion of that right must be unlawful or unjustifiable.")
Thus, the third subordinate issue is whether the intrusion, if it occurred, was otherwise justified.
Wilson may attempt to justify his actions on the basis of privilege. Privileges "may be divided into two general categories: (1) consent, and (2) privileges created by law irrespective of consent. In
general, the latter arise where there is some important and overriding social value in sanctioning defendant's conduct, despite the fact
that it causes plaintiff harm." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1078 (5th
ed. 1979);7 see also Leggeet v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 86
Or. App. 523, 739 P.2d 1083 (1987) (discussing both defenses in its
analysis of an employer's alleged intrusion into an employee's
seclusion).
a. Consent
Consent vitiates the tort of intrusion. Leggett v. First Interstate
Bank of Oregon, 86 Or. App. 523, 739 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1987).
"[T]here is no actionable invasion of privacy if the plaintiff has consented, the consent has not been revoked, and the defendant has
acted within the scope of the consent." Id. To be effective, however,
consent must be informed. See, e.g., Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d
609, 617-18 (Iowa 1973) (doctor held liable for battery where he obtained consent from his patient for a specific medical procedure and
intentionally deviated from the consent and performed a substantially different treatment).
In this case Wilson should argue that Slater either expressly or
impliedly consented to taking the HIV test when he willingly participated in the medical testing program. Slater, on the other hand,
should argue that his consent, being general and not being informed,
was insufficient to justify Wilson's actions.
b. Employer's Privilege
Under the tort of intrusion, a qualified privilege exists to protect employers under certain narrow circumstances. See, e.g., Eddy
v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986); McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp.,
271 Ore. 549, 533 P.2d 343 (1975); Hoesel v. United States, 451 F.
Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 629 F. 2d 586 (9th Cir. 1980).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Eddy found that a work supervisor has a legitimate interest in examining his employee's medical
records. 715 P.2d 74. In McLain an employer was held not liable for

76 Pa. Commw. 8, 463 A.2d 87, 89 (1983) (".

7. "Although courts have not expressly adopted common law privileges and defenses in intrusion into seclusion actions, defendants should be conscious of such justification when fashioning arguments to excuse conduct that has been alleged to be
objectionably intrusive." 1 Privacy Law and Practice,T 1.06 at 1-80 (G. Trubow ed.
1987).
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its investigation of an employee's workman's compensation claim.
271 Ore. 549, 533 P.2d 343. While the employee had a right to be
free from intrusion, his right was subordinate to his employer's privilege to assess the veracity of that employee's claim. Id.
In Hoes1, the plaintiff sued his employer's staff psychiatrist for
libel. The court stated that employers "obviously have a legitimate
need and even a duty to determine whether or not their employees
are professionally, physically and psychologically capable of performing their duties." 451 F. Supp. at 1176.
Similarly, in Leggett v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 86 Or.
App. 523, 739 P.2d 1083 (1987), the plaintiff sued her employer for,
inter alia, invasion of privacy in discussing her condition with her
clinical psychologist. The employer claimed that it had a legitimate
interest in determining her condition and was, therefore, not liable.
739 P.2d at 1086. The court agreed that "an employer does have a
legitimate interest in determining an [employee's] condition to the
extent that it relates to employment. That interest must be balanced against the nature and extent of the intrusion in deciding if
an intrusion has occurred." Id.
Wilson could also cite to McDonnell for support. 612 F. Supp.
1122. In discussing an employee's expectation of privacy in body
fluids, that court noted that the "Fourth Amendment does not preclude taking a body fluid specimen as part of. . .any routine periodic physical examination that may be required of employee, . . ."
Id. at 1130 n. 6. Moreover, Wilson could argue that if the United
States Constitution allows government employers to examine employees' body fluids, a private employer, such as Wilson, should have
a privilege to conduct such tests as well.
Slater's counter-argument is twofold. First, he should argue that
even if Wilson had a legitimate interest in determining Slater's condition, Wilson's interest weighs slight when balanced against the unreasonable intrusiveness of its action. See, Leggett, 86 Or. App. 523,
739 P.2d 1083, 1086 (suggesting that employer's interest must be
weighed against the nature and extent of the intrusion). Second,
Slater should argue that while an employer may have a need to test
for some information, it has no need to test for the AIDS antibody
because AIDS is not transmissible in the workplace. Slater has support for this argument in the CDC recommendations; "Because
AIDS is a bloodborne, sexually transmitted disease that is not
spread by casual contact, this document does not recommend routine HTLV-III/LAS antibody screening for" most workers. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human
T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
682-83 (1985). The CDC recommendations further state that "[njo
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known risk of transmission to co-workers, clients, or consumers exists from HTLV-III/LAV-infected workers in. . .settings [such as]
offices, schools, factories, construction sites, etc." Id. at 694.

Finally, Slater could argue that Wilson has no need to test for
the AIDS antibody because it would be against public policy to dismiss an employee with AIDS. For this argument Slater has support
by analogy to cases construing the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796. Section 504 of the Act provides that no
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from participation in any program receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796. In School
Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1132
(1987), the United States Supreme Court found a woman with tuberculosis to be handicapped within the meaning of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. The Court noted that Arline does not reach
the "questions whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as
AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or
whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act." 107 S.
Ct. at 1128 n. 7.
Attempting to fill the gap left in footnote 7 of Arline, the Justice Department has taken the position that an employer who discriminates on the basis of the disabling effects of AIDS violates Section 504 of the Act. Cross and Haney, Legal Issues Involved in
Private Sector Medical Testing of Job Applicants and Employees,
20 IND. L. REV. 517, 527 (1987). Thus, Slater should argue that these
decisions suggest that AIDS testing by an employer is not only unnecessary but also highly disfavored. Moreover, he should argue that
while Wilson may have an interest in testing for some highly contagious disease, it has little, if any, interest in testing for a disease that
is not casually transmitted.
B. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
The second issue presented by this appeal is whether Wilson
invaded Slater's privacy when he disclosed to members of the general public the fact that Slater tested positive for the AIDS antibody. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of

another is subject to liability to the other for the invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (1977).
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To establish his prima facie case for public disclosure of private
facts, the plaintiff must show (1) the existence of private matters in
which the public has no legitimate concern (2) which the defendant
disclosed to others (3) absent any waiver of privilege (4) such as to
bring humiliation or shame to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Buller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 648 S.W.2d 473, 482 (Mo. App. 1984).
1. The Protected Interest: Private Facts
The first subordinate issue in this count is whether Slater's condition is a private matter that is not of legitimate concern to the
public. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that the interest protected by this cause of action includes private facts, the disclosure of which would be highly offensive. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D comment c. The Restatement further provides that
''many unpleasant or disgraceful of humiliating diseases" are "normally entirely private matters." Id. at comment b. Considering the
nature of AIDS, it would appear that it is an unpleasant disease
and, therefore, a private matter within the Restatement's definition.
Wilson may argue that he discussed only the fact that Slater
tested positive for the HIV antibody and did not say whether Slater
had AIDS. Such an argument, however, may be tenuous since the
public generally views testing positive for the HIV antibody as tantamount to having AIDS. Rather than posing a challenge to the existence of private facts, then, Wilson will likely argue (1) that there
was no disclosure or (2) that he was privileged in making the
disclosure.
2. The Prohibited Conduct: A Disclosure
The second subordinate issue is whether Wilson's discussing
Slater's conditions with his friends at the business luncheon
amounts to an actionable disclosure. The Restatement provides that
it is not an invasion of privacy "to communicate a fact concerning
the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group
of person." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comment a. It
must be a "communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public." Id. The rule of publication as an element of this privacy tort
differs from
the rule in defamation, wherein disclosure to one other than
the plaintiff constitutes actionable publication. Here, it is the
general rule that the disclosure must be widespread, as to the
public at large, in order for it to be actionable. However, it has
been held that the publicity requirement may be satisfied 'by
proof of disclosure to a very limited number of people when a
special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the "public" to whom the information has been disclosed.'
1 Privacy Law and Practice, 1.05[1] at 1-50 (G. Trubow ed. 1987)
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(citations and footnotes omitted).
Discussing the issue of publicity in privacy cases, Justice Smith
stated that "[t]he wrong depends not upon . .. an arithmetical
measure of the numbers who witnessed the exposure . . . ." Hawley
v.Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835, 841
(1956) (Smith, J., dissenting from majority ruling that credit bureau's sending a letter to employer concerning employee's financial
status not an actionable intrusion).
In accord with Justice Smith's analysis, the Supreme Court of
Michigan stated that
[a]n invasion of a plaintiff's right to privacy is important if it
exposes private facts to a public whose knowledge of those
facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff. Such a public
might be the general public, if the person were a public figure,
or a particular public such as fellow employees, club members,
church members, family, or neighbors, if the person were not a
public figure.
Here we have developed the criterion of a particular public,
whose knowledge of the private facts would be embarrassing to
the plaintiff. . . .As Justice Smith said, we do not engage in a
numbers game and therefore we leave the criterion here announced to be illustrated by this and future cases.
Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977).
In this case the facts suggest the existence of a publication. Wilson disclosed the results of Slater's HIV tests to a table of individuals at a meeting, attended by approximately 75 people. However, the
actual number of people to whom the information was disclosed and
whether those recipients are members of Slater's particular public
are probably questions of fact. Slater could argue, however, (1) that
Wilson's disclosure to several of Wilson's friends, regardless of how
many there were or who they were, amounts to actionable disclosure
as a matter of law or (2) that the applicable rule of publication
should parallel that of defamation in this case, making Wilson's
public disclosure of Slater's condition actionable as a matter of law.
Even if the Court agrees with Slater, however, Wilson could defeat
Slater's claim if he can show that the disclosure was privileged.
3. Employer's Privilege
Wilson, as Slater's employer, has a conditional privilege' to disclose information concerning Slater's condition. See Bratt v. Inter8. "Such a privilege is conditioned upon reasonable and proper exercise, and is
abused and lost if the communication is knowingly false or for an improper or illegal
purpose, or made to a recipient who is not reasonably able to carry out the purpose of
the privileged occasion." 1 Privacy Law and Practice, 1.04[61[a] at 1-31 thru 1-32
(G. Trubow, ed. 1987).
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national Business Machines, 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d 126, 133
(1984). In Bratt the plaintiff sued his employer for, inter alia, public
disclosure of private facts. The plaintiff alleged that there was improper disclosure of a company physician's description of him as being paranoid. The court concluded that under the Massachusetts
right of privacy statute only unreasonable disclosure is proscribed
and that an employer may have countervailing interests which may
make the disclosure reasonable. Id.
Wilson should argue that his disclosure was not unreasonable
since it was made during an employment-related activity and only to
those who had been discussing the disease. He should also argue
that the information was completely true and not disclosed with any
intention other than to inform his fellow businessmen that such
tests are both available and informative.
Slater, on the other hand, should argue that unlike the disclosure in Bratt which was made to other employees, Wilson's disclosure
was made to members of the general public. Moreover, he should
argue that since a common interest does not exist outside the sphere
of employment, Wilson was not justified in his disclosure to members of the general public.
4. Privilege To Disclose To Those Who Need The Information
The privilege to disclose is governed by a reasonableness standard. Levias v. United Airlines, 27 Ohio App. 2d 222, 500 N.E.2d
340 (1985). Publication is limited to those who the disclosure believes have a "real need to know, not mere curiosity." 500 N.E.2d at
374. In Levias a flight attendant sued her employer for the disclosure by its medical examiner to both her supervisor and her husband
her excessive menstruation and need for gynecological surgery. 500
N.E.2d at 373. The court found the employer in error since neither
the attendant's supervisor nor her husband had a "real need to
know." Thus, existence of the privilege turns upon whether Wilson,
in disclosing Slater's condition to the public, gave the information to
those who had a real need to know.
Slater should argue that, considering (1) the modes of transmission of the disease and (2) the absence of any evidence that those to
whom Wilson disclosed information about Slater's condition were
Slater's sexual partners or otherwise likely to be exposed to Slater's
blood, Wilson exceeded his privilege since he disclosed Slater's condition to members of the general public. The people who attended
the luncheon were merely curious and did not have a "real need to
know." Levias, 27 Ohio App. 3d 222, 500 N.E.2d at 374.
Wilson, on the other hand, should argue that insofar as the public fears AIDS virus as a very novel and lethal disease, members of
the public have more than just "mere curiosity" in identifying those
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that have been exposed to the disease. Id.
Slater could rebut Wilson's arguments by arguing, first, that
even though information concerning AIDS transmissibility is not
complete, there is no reliable information (indeed, Wilson has offered no information to rebut that which was offered by Slater) to
suggest that the AIDS virus may be transmitted by causal contact.
Second, he could argue that even though the public may have fears
about the transmissibility of AIDS, their fears, being unfounded, are
not sufficient to affect Slater's right to privacy.0
Wilson should respond by arguing that AIDS is a recently discovered disease. The medical research is only a few years old. Since
there may be flaws in the research and considering the mortality
rate of those who have contracted AIDS, the public's fears are
justified.

9. Slater has support by analogy to cases construing the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796. See, e.g., Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123. The Court in Arline
stated that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act proscribes the denial of jobs or
other benefits to those having contagious diseases "because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others." 107 S. Ct. at 1129. It further stated that the "Act is
carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound judgments ....
" Id. Thus,
Slater could argue that employers making decisions respecting employees with contagious diseases are to find guidance in medical evidence and not in society's unfounded
fears.

